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Interbank Contagion in the Dutch Banking
Sector: A Sensitivity Analysis∗
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bSupervisory Policy Division, De Nederlandsche Bank
We investigate interlinkages and contagion risks in the
Dutch interbank market. Based on several data sources, includ-
ing survey data, we estimate the exposures in the interbank
market at bank level. Next, we perform a scenario analysis
to measure contagion risks. We ﬁnd that the bankruptcy of
one of the large banks will put a considerable burden on the
other banks but will not lead to a complete collapse of the
interbank market. The exposures to foreign counterparties are
large and warrant further research. An important contribu-
tion of this paper is that we show, using survey data, that the
entropy estimation using large exposures data as applied in
many previous papers gives an adequate approximation of the
actual linkages between banks. Hence, this methodology does
not seem to introduce a bias.
JEL Codes: G15, G20.
1. Introduction
The interbank market is an important market in managing a bank’s
liquid funds. It is a market with largely unsecured exposures of
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shop participants of the CCBS Expert forum at the Bank of England on May
17–19, 2004, and two anonymous referees for useful comments. All remaining
errors are our own. Author contact: De Nederlandsche Bank, Supervisory Policy
Division, P.O. Box 98, 1000 AB Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Tel: +31 (0)20
524 2024, e-mail: i.p.p.van.lelyveld@dnb.nl or tel. +31 (0)20 524 2385, e-mail:
f.r.liedorp@dnb.nl. Alternate address for van Lelyveld: P.O. Box 9108, 6500 HK,
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signiﬁcant size. Furthermore, the banking sector is consolidating
more and more in many countries, leading to an evermore inter-
linked market. Such a closely linked market might be prone to con-
tagion. These developments have led researchers and policymakers
alike to take an interest in this subject, resulting in a number of
valuable studies. These studies, which we will discuss in more detail
shortly, generally rely on proxies of actual bank-to-bank exposures.
An important ﬁnding is that the fragility of the interbank market
is highly dependent on the characteristics of the market: both the
market structure and the magnitude of interbank linkages determine
the contagion path.
The present study adds to the literature in two ways. First, we
are able to shed light on the validity of the proxy for exposures used
in previous studies. In addition to information on large exposures for
nearly the entire market, we have direct information about bank-to-
bank exposures from a selected number of banks, covering about
80 percent of the market. Comparing the results based on the large
exposure proxy and the survey exposures provides evidence that the
proxy used in previous studies seems to be an adequate one. Sec-
ond, the process of consolidation has gone further in the Netherlands
than in most countries; loans and deposits of the ﬁve largest banks,
as a percentage of the total, were at 79 percent and 88 percent,
respectively, in 2004. Furthermore, the Netherlands is a small open
economy. The Dutch case can thus serve as a natural experiment,
showing what the eﬀects of contagion are in a closely linked market.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses exist-
ing research, while section 3 explains the methodology and describes
the data sources and data characteristics. Then we present an analy-
sis of the results in section 4. We pay particular attention to the
comparison between the results based on the two separate data
sources. Section 5 presents our conclusions and the policy impli-
cations implied by the analysis.
2. Previous Research into the Interbank Market
Only recently a strand of literature has begun to analyze the struc-
ture of the interbank market as a source of ﬁnancial sector conta-
gion. Theory discerns both direct and indirect contagion (de Bandt
and Hartmann 2000). Direct contagion results from direct (ﬁnancial)
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linkages between banks, such as credit exposures. Indirect contagion
is the result of expectations about a bank’s health and about the
resilience of the sector. In contrast, the exposure of banks to similar
events (such as asset price ﬂuctuations) cannot, by deﬁnition, result
in direct contagion.1 Obviously, although these two contagion chan-
nels can work separately, direct contagion and indirect contagion
are not mutually exclusive and may even reinforce each other. For
instance, a bank failure may lead to further bank failures through
direct linkages and may induce further bankruptcies even if deposi-
tors only assume the existence of linkages between banks (regardless
of whether these assumptions are true or not). In our paper, we
focus on direct linkages between banks and thus on the risk of direct
contagion.
In the literature, it has become clear that the structure of the
interbank market is of crucial importance for contagion, as it deter-
mines the impact of a shock to an individual bank on the complete
system. Allen and Gale (2000) distinguish three types of interbank
market structures. First, they deﬁne a complete structure as one
where banks are symmetrically linked to all other banks in the sys-
tem. Second, an incomplete market structure exists when banks are
only linked to neighboring banks. A special case of this structure—
the money-center structure—is introduced by Freixas, Parigi, and
Rochet (2000). In this structure, the money-center bank is linked
symmetrically to the other banks, while the latter have no links
among themselves. Third, a disconnected incomplete market struc-
ture is deﬁned as one where two separate (but internally connected)
markets exist simultaneously. A complete market structure may give
the highest level of insurance against unexpected liquidity shocks
hitting an individual bank because of diversiﬁcation eﬀects. How-
ever, such a structure might also spread shocks more easily through
the system, as shocks will not remain isolated at one bank or at a
cluster of banks. In a model based on that of Diamond and Dybvig
(1983), Dasgupta (2004) investigates the eﬀect of a signal about a
bank’s health on customers’ expectations and shows that contagion
mainly runs from debtor banks to creditor banks.
1However, assumed similarities in banks’ risk structure may lead to indirect
contagion.
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Empirical studies that try to model the structure of the inter-
bank market and the following contagion risks have been carried out
for several countries (Elsinger, Lehar, and Summer, forthcoming;
Degryse and Nguyen 2004; Upper and Worms 2004; Mistrulli 2005;
Bl˚avarg and Nimander 2002; Sheldon and Maurer 1998; and Wells
2004). See table 1. Most of these studies use balance sheet data or
large exposures data as proxies to determine the interbank market
structure. Bl˚avarg and Nimander (2002) and Mistrulli (2005) use
bilateral observed data to model contagion risk. Mistrulli concludes
that in the Italian case, the estimation based on aggregate data may
underestimate contagion risk. However, this conclusion is based on
a comparison of the results using, on the one hand, the maximum
entropy and, on the other hand, the observed bilateral exposure
data. Given the emergence of a money-center-bank structure in the
Italian interbank market, it is clear that the assumption of maxi-
mum entropy becomes less appropriate. Mu¨ller (2003) explores the
Swiss interbank market using new data from the Swiss National
Bank. Applying network analysis,2 she discerns systemically impor-
tant banks and possible contagion paths. Furﬁne (1999) estimates
contagion risk in the U.S. interbank market but uses bilateral data
from the Fedwire payment system to build the interbank market
structure. The majority of these studies ﬁnd that contagion eﬀects
are small, especially since high loss rates are rare. This paper is
related to these studies in several ways. For one, we base our analy-
sis on balance sheet data and large exposures data as well. Further-
more, we use diﬀerent loss rates to test the strength of the system
under diﬀerent shocks. However, we add a second model variant
in which we incorporate the answers of banks with respect to their
bilateral exposures. This provides the opportunity to test the useful-
ness of the large exposures data for estimating the interbank market
structure.
Nevertheless, all these models focus on the credit or solvency
risk of a bank failure and usually do not incorporate the eﬀects
of liquidity risk, such as the drying up of credit lines or falling
asset prices. Mu¨ller (2003) introduces liquidity risk in the Swiss
2Mu¨ller (2003) measures, for example, the number and size of interbank inter-
linkages, the distance from other banks, the importance of counterparties, and
the position in the network.
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interbank market through the existence of credit lines but ﬁnds
that such contagion eﬀects are smaller compared with the risk of
credit exposures. In a theoretical paper, Cifuentes, Ferrucci, and
Shin (2005) model the impact of asset sales of distressed banks
on asset prices and the liquidity and solvency position of other
banks. They conclude that liquidity requirements can be as eﬀec-
tive as capital requirements to prevent contagion eﬀects. Allen
and Gale (2004) also analyze liquidity eﬀects and the impact on
asset prices and ﬁnancial fragility. Cocco, Gomes, and Martins
(2003) model lending relationships in the interbank market and
the behavior of market participants, suggesting that such relation-
ships are important. Obviously, this kind of research merits further
attention.
3. Methodology and Data
3.1 Interbank-Lending Matrix
To model the structure of interbank linkages between N banks,
we use a matrix like X (ﬁgure 1). In this matrix, the columns
represent banks’ lending, while the rows represent banks’ borrow-
ing. Hence, xij gives the liabilities of bank i toward bank j. Clearly,
not all banks need to be a lender and a borrower at the same
time. In fact, a bank need not be active in the interbank mar-
ket at all. In such a case, we would ﬁll the corresponding cell(s)
with a zero. Moreover, a bank does not lend to itself: the cells on
the main diagonal from upper left to bottom right would all be
zeros.
The information problem can then be identiﬁed as follows: the
sum of each bank’s interbank lending and borrowing, aj and li,
is known. These data can be obtained from the monthly balance
sheet report. What is not known is the distribution of these expo-
sures over the system, i.e., the elements of the matrix X itself. The
lack of information cannot be solved easily, as the problem contains
more unknowns than equations. Thus, the problem is underiden-
tiﬁed, which implies that several solutions may lead to the same
outcome (Upper and Worms 2004). There is no unique solution to
this problem.
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Figure 1. Interbank-Lending Matrix
Source: Upper and Worms (2004).
One solution would be to divide the aggregate exposure propor-
tionally over all N banks. This is called entropy maximization.3 A
diﬃculty with this solution is that it assumes that all lending and
borrowing is as dispersed as possible, i.e., interbank activities are
completely diversiﬁed. This rules out the possibility of relationship
banking.4
Another way of solving the problem is to add additional infor-
mation. The large exposures data might be suitable to this end but
require some additional assumptions. In using the large exposures
data, we assume that the distribution obtained from these data is
representative of the real distribution of exposures. This is not neces-
sarily true, of course. However, it does improve the picture of the con-
centration of interbank lending and borrowing. Wells (2004) explains
that, given the estimate of the interbank structure (for instance, the
3This problem can be compared to the outcome of rolling a pair of dice. Unless
one has information that the dice are loaded in some way, the distribution that
places equal weight on each outcome should be selected. But this distribution
also maximizes the uncertainty, or entropy, about the outcome. Therefore, in
the absence of information about concentrations in the interbank market, the
maximum entropy distribution is chosen.
4As Cocco, Gomes, and Martins (2003) show, however, banks might want to
establish relationships with banks whose liquidity shocks are less correlated with
their own.
108 International Journal of Central Banking June 2006
large exposures data), a minimization problem needs to be solved to
ﬁnd a matrix that gets as close to the estimate as possible, given the
interbank lending and borrowing totals. This matrix is calculated
by use of the RAS algorithm (see also the appendix).
A last approach would be to ask all banks to report their bilateral
exposures, including the names of the counterparties and the actual
amount of the exposure. Owing to the reporting cost, this is deemed
impossible for the Dutch banking system as a whole, although we
did obtain information from the most important banks.
In this paper we apply the ﬁrst two approaches (maximum
entropy and cross-entropy minimization), although we focus on the
approach that adds additional information, as this seems the more
relevant one. We add additional information in two diﬀerent ways:
ﬁrst using only large exposure reporting and then adding ad hoc sur-
vey information as described in the next section. This also allows us
to compare the outcomes and make an inference about the appropri-
ateness of large exposures data for estimating the interbank market
structure and contagion eﬀects.
3.2 Data Sources
It is rather diﬃcult to determine the precise structure of the inter-
bank market. No information is publicly available about the size
of the interlinkages in the interbank market. On a conﬁdential
basis De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB), as prudential supervisor,
regularly receives balance sheet data and large exposures reports.
For the analysis, three main data sources have been used, which
we will discuss in turn: the monthly balance sheet report, the
large exposures data report, and an ad hoc survey obtained from
the largest ten banks. The monthly report reﬂects the aggregate
interbank assets and liabilities of a bank and is comparable to
the U.S. Call Report. Balance sheet data have been collected for
December 2002 from all banks under supervision, including foreign
subsidiaries and branches. These data concern consolidated data
about interbank assets and liabilities, tier 1 capital, and total assets.
Interbank exposures are inﬂuenced by the end-of-year eﬀect. This
implies that reported exposures at this date are lower compared
with the rest of the year. However, foreign branches with a parent
company within the European Union are exempted from reporting
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tier 1 capital, since DNB plays no role in solvency supervision of
these banks.5
In the large exposures data report, banks must specify the names
and amounts of bank counterparties to which they have an expo-
sure larger than 3 percent of their actual own funds; they must also
specify the names and amounts of nonbank counterparties for expo-
sures larger than 10 percent of their actual own funds. The report
is subject to many exceptions, and some banks are exempted from
reporting.6 Moreover, most banks only report risk limits and not
the actual outstanding amounts, and not all exposures (such as oﬀ-
balance-sheet positions) are accounted for. From the large exposures
data reports, exposures on home (Dutch) and foreign (non-Dutch)
bank counterparties have been selected.
To obtain complete information on the larger part of the inter-
bank exposures, the top ten banks with respect to interbank assets
were asked to ﬁll in a survey on bilateral exposures. Names and
amounts—based on interbank deposits, derivatives, and securities—
together with an indication as to whether these amounts concern
limits or outstandings, were requested for all Dutch bank counter-
parties for December 2002. In addition, the same data were required
for the ﬁfteen largest foreign bank counterparties. However, we only
use the information about interbank deposits in this analysis, since
derivatives (oﬀ balance sheet) and securities are not included in the
monthly balance sheet reporting. In general, both the limits and out-
standings of the interbank derivatives portfolio are larger than those
for the deposit portfolio. This becomes especially clear from the out-
standing interbank derivatives, which are on average about 2.5 times
larger than interbank deposits, while limits on the derivatives port-
folio are on average 1.6 times larger. In contrast, the reported out-
standing securities as well as the limits are on average smaller than
5In the 1992 Law on Supervision of Credit Institutions, the aspect of “home-
country control” was introduced as a consequence of the “EU license.” With
home-country control, branches of banks located in the EU only need a license
from the country of origin and are subject to solvency supervision of this country.
The host country does play a role in liquidity supervision.
6Not all certiﬁed banks are required to report their large exposures data.
Branches with a parent company located inside the EU are exempted from
reporting. Intraconcern exposures are exempted as well.
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those on the interbank deposit portfolio, although this outcome may
be related to the data quality.
3.3 Data Description
The Dutch interbank market, based on reporting of all Dutch banks
for December 2002, covers about e93 billion of interbank assets and
e364 billion of interbank liabilities. This is, respectively, 10 percent
and 20 percent of the total balance sheet value of the banks and
210 percent and 397 percent of actual own funds. These exposures
are largely not collateralized. The Dutch banks hence borrow on the
international interbank market and have a net debit position relative
to the rest of the world. This may render the Dutch banking system
more likely to be the source of contagion rather than the “victim.”
The market is dominated by a few large banks, which cover 77 per-
cent (e149 billion) of interbank assets and 85 percent (e309 billion)
of interbank liabilities. This dominance restricts the number of pos-
sible counterparties in the market and therefore increases contagion
risks.
In tables 2 and 3, we present descriptive statistics for the diﬀer-
ent types of ﬁrms active in the Dutch market. Standard deviations
are shown in parentheses. Naturally, there are more observations per
bank in the large exposures data report compared with the monthly
report, as banks are, in most cases, exposed to several counterparties.
Additionally, table 3 is divided into risk limits and risk outstandings.
These descriptives show, unsurprisingly, that the large banks
are the largest party in the market. The remaining types seem
to play only a limited role in the interbank market. Remarkably,
for all types, interbank liabilities are larger than interbank assets.
All Dutch banks, even the smaller ones, are hence net borrowers
on the international interbank market. For the foreign subsidiaries
and branches, this might be attributed to the link with the parent
company.
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics for the survey data. The ten
largest banks that were requested to report these data are of the ﬁrst
three types discerned in the previous tables. We use interbank out-
standings from the survey data instead of interbank limits, except
for one bank, which only reports risk limits. Zero-risk exposures have
been excluded.
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Table 3. Descriptives by Type: Large Exposures Data
(x Million Euro), November/December 2002
Limit Outstanding
Number of Mean Number of Mean
Type Observations (St. Dev.) Observations (St. Dev.)
Large Bank 255 2,131 22 409
(2,076) (380)
Other Dutch 188 85 153 45
(121) (72)
Foreign Subsidiary 125 48 216 33
(62) (48)
Foreign Branch 37 12 74 6
(24) (5)
Investment Firm – – 26 8
– (7)
All Banks 605 935 491 48
(1,692) (123)
Note: Based on bank counterparties, zero-risk exposures are excluded.
Table 4. Descriptives by Type: Survey Data
(x Million Euro), December 2002
Limit Outstanding
Number of Mean Number of Mean
Type Observations (St. Dev.) Observations (St. Dev.)
Large Bank 33 1,206 56 705
(1,272) (2,550)
Other Dutch 0 – 161 60
– (320)
Foreign Subsidiary 0 – 11 32
– (32)
All Banks 33 1,206 228 217
(1,272) (1,314)
Note: Based on bank counterparties, zero-risk exposures are excluded.
Vol. 2 No. 2 Interbank Contagion in the Dutch Banking Sector 113
An analysis of the number and relative size of the exposures on
the counterparties (Dutch banks, foreign banks) in the survey data
shows that a high number of exposures does not necessarily coin-
cide with a high exposure. This holds especially for the exposures
on Dutch counterparties, on which the highest number of exposures
is reported, whereas the relative exposure (the exposure as a per-
centage of total exposure) per Dutch bank counterparty is lowest.
This decreases the impact of an individual failure, because the loss is
relatively small; however, it increases contagion risk, as many banks
are linked.
3.4 Scenario Analysis
To measure the risk of contagion in the Dutch banking system, we
perform a scenario analysis, using the obtained interbank-lending
matrix. To do this, all banks are assumed to fail in turn owing to
some exogenous shock. A bankruptcy does not imply that the coun-
terparties of the failed bank lose the total amount of their expo-
sure, as the sale of (some part of) the failed bank’s assets may oﬀer
compensation.
The possibilities for compensation depend, though, on the bank-
ruptcy legislation in a country. However, little information is avail-
able about the level of recovery (i.e., the loss rate).7 Therefore, we
use several loss rates (25 percent, 50 percent, 75 percent, and 100
percent) in this analysis to assess the resilience of the banks. Note
that losses, even temporary ones, can have direct and immediate
consequences for the liquidity position of a bank and hence for its
solvency.8
We assume that a bank fails if its exposure to a failed bank (i.e.,
its loss) is larger than its tier 1 capital:
θ *xij > cj , (1)
7James (1991) ﬁnds a mean loss rate of 30 percent of the assets of the failed
bank and another 10 percent as direct bankruptcy costs. Furﬁne (1999) uses a
loss rate of only 5 percent.
8An interesting theoretical paper in this respect is Cifuentes, Ferrucci, and
Shin (2005), where the authors show that if the recovery rate becomes endoge-
nous (and capital requirements or exposure limits are binding), a small shock
might already have a large impact.
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where θ denotes the loss rate, xij is the exposure of bank j toward
bank i (alternatively, xij represents bank i’s liabilities to bank j),
and cj is the tier 1 capital of bank j. If more than one bank fails, a
third bank fails if its exposure to these two banks is larger than its
tier 1 capital:
θ * (xij + xkj) > cj . (2)
In the analysis, we assume that the time span between a perceived
increase in credit risk of a bank and the actual failure of the bank
is too short for other banks to decrease their exposure to the bank
in question. In addition, we do not model increased risk awareness
following the initial default, and we thus assume that the loss rate is
constant over time. In assessing the scenarios, we report the results
prenetting because we are interested in a truly severe scenario. Obvi-
ously, having liabilities to a failed bank reduces the net exposure and
thus the possible loss. Such a robustness check shows us that, com-
pared with the results discussed in the next section, the eﬀects in
the netted case are much smaller, but the overall picture remains
the same.
Completely idiosyncratic shocks are rare, and thus our assump-
tion that at ﬁrst only a single bank fails due to some exogenous
shock might be a relatively strong one. It seems more likely that
several banks will be simultaneously aﬀected in the case of a shock.
Moreover, a bankruptcy is often preceded by a period of distress,
and thus other banks are able to take measures in time. Never-
theless, operational risk events are a diﬀerent matter, as exempli-
ﬁed by the Barings Bank case. There, activities of a single trader
led to the demise of the entire bank. In this case, the factor that
triggered the failure was idiosyncratic to Barings Bank, so that
other banks were not inﬂuenced by this shock. Therefore, it has
to be kept in mind that although such scenarios may be rather
rare events, such shocks do occur. Next to that, such a severe
scenario analysis may be useful in determining the sequence and
path of contagion. Still, modeling the probability of default, con-
ditional on the state of the economy and/or crisis, would also be
a possible future improvement (cf. Elsinger, Lehar, and Summer,
forthcoming).
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4. Results
4.1 Interbank-Lending Matrices
In this section, we ﬁrst present the interbank-lending matrix based
on the large exposures data and then discuss the matrix estimated
with the survey data.9
4.1.1 Large Exposures Data
We constructed the largest possible data set of both interbank assets
and liabilities and large exposures data, resulting in a data set of 88
banks.10 The exposures on foreign banks have been divided into ﬁve
geographical areas: Europe, North America, Turkey, Asia, and RoW
(rest of world). Hence each bank has 92 (88+5−1) possible counter-
parties. The interbank assets and liabilities are then divided over the
matrix, following the structure of the large exposures data reports.11
A problem with this approach is that some banks report limits, while
other banks report outstandings. This would result in a bias in the
estimation toward limit-reporting banks, because the limit amounts
are much larger than the outstanding amounts. In our estimation
we would then assign a too-high exposure to limit-reporting banks.
To circumvent this problem, we express the large exposures data
as a percentage of each bank’s “total exposure.” Here, the “total
exposure” can be either total outstandings or the total of all lim-
its. Then the percentage exposures are multiplied with the monthly
report asset totals, giving exposure amounts. In the few cases where
the large exposures data are missing (not all banks have to report),
we use the distribution of interbank liabilities. In addition, because
we do not want to allow a bank to have exposures on itself, we set
the main diagonal to zero. For estimation purposes, all zeros in the
matrix (i.e., a bank pair without a reported linkage) are replaced by
a very small number (except for the main diagonal). This reﬂects
9We also estimated a maximum-entropy matrix without any prior information,
but as these results are less informative, we do not present them here.
10For the foreign branches that do not report tier 1 capital, we use the mean
tier 1 capital of a peer group.
11A formal explanation can be found in the appendix.
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the many small linkages that banks may have but which fall below
the reporting threshold and thus do not show up in the large expo-
sures data. Because of this last assumption, banks have linkages with
almost all other banks in the interbank-lending matrix, although
the estimated exposures resulting from this assumption are small,
as expected.
The percentage exposures on all foreign regions together vary
between 0 percent and 100 percent of total exposures, where only
a few foreign subsidiaries or branches show a 100 percent expo-
sure. The exposure is particularly risky for such banks because the
exposure is almost completely on a single foreign region (i.e., the
home country, sometimes only the parent company). The average
bank is exposed for about one-third (32.0 percent) of its interbank
assets to foreign regions. The large banks are exposed to foreign
regions by more than three-quarters (ranging between 72.6 percent
and 84.6 percent) of their total exposure. The explanation for this
higher average may lie in the fact that these banks do not consider
the other Dutch banks as interesting counterparties. Of all regions,
Europe accounts for most exposures, followed by North America.
Generally, large banks have signiﬁcant relations with a smaller
number of banks than do other banks.12 The average exposure of a
smaller bank to a large bank is about 28 percent of its total expo-
sures, which we consider small in comparison with the market size
of the larger banks. Strikingly, we ﬁnd that foreign branches are
mainly exposed to other Dutch banks (69.5 percent), while foreign
subsidiaries show a higher dependency on foreign countries (table 5).
From this estimated structure of interlinkages, we might deduce the
existence of a two-tiered structure in the Dutch interbank market:
the ﬁrst tier consists of the large banks, which transact mainly with
each other and with foreign (same-sized) counterparties, while the
second tier consists of the remaining banks, which mainly transact
with each other and to a certain extent with foreign counterparties.
The two tiers are connected, but to a lesser extent than we would
expect taking into account the dominance of the large banks in the
interbank market.
12Since all banks are interlinked (because all zeros in the matrix are replaced
by a small number), a threshold value is set to measure the relative number of
exposures.
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Table 5. Estimated Interbank-Lending Matrix:
Large Exposures Data
% exposure of → Large Other Foreign Foreign Investment
on↓ Bank Dutch Subsidiary Branch Firm Mean
Foreign 78.8 20.5 47.2 20.3 22.1 32.0
Other Dutch 6.8 42.3 26.5 69.5 41.2 43.8
G4 14.4 37.3 26.5 10.1 36.6 24.3
Table 6. Estimated Interbank-Lending Matrix:
Survey Data
% exposure of → Large Other Foreign Foreign Investment
on↓ Bank Dutch Subsidiary Branch Firm Mean
Foreign 90.3 19.1 45.5 15.6 18.7 29.9
Other Dutch 4.2 58.3 37.1 78.7 51.5 54.7
G4 5.5 22.7 17.4 5.6 29.8 15.4
The percentages shown in table 5 are the average exposures per
type. Note that although the large banks are exposed only for 6.8
percent of their total exposures to other Dutch banks, the expo-
sure in absolute amounts may well exceed the absolute amount of,
for instance, the 42.3 percent of the exposure of “Other Dutch” to
other Dutch banks.
4.1.2 Survey Data
In the second variant, the survey data obtained from the ten banks
are used and substituted in the interbank-lending matrix. For the
remaining banks, we continue to use the large exposures data. The
percentage exposures of individual banks on the foreign regions vary
between 0 percent and 100 percent of total exposures, where on aver-
age the exposure on foreign regions decreases slightly to 29.9 percent.
For the large banks, however, the exposures on foreign regions have
increased for all four banks (now ranging between 76.3 percent and
99.8 percent). In general, the exposures of the large banks are less
dispersed over the Dutch system and are concentrated on foreign
exposures (table 6). Europe remains the largest “single” exposure
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for Dutch banks, followed by North America. The remaining banks
show a somewhat higher exposure to each other, which explains the
decrease in the mean exposure on foreign regions and on the large
banks. We again ﬁnd a high exposure of foreign branches to other
Dutch banks (78.7 percent). These ﬁgures also support our inference
about the existence of a two-tiered structure in the Dutch interbank
market. Moreover, the use of diﬀerent data sources leads to only
slightly diﬀerent outcomes with respect to the characteristics of the
Dutch interbank market.
4.2 Scenario Analyses
After estimating the interbank-lending matrix, we run a scenario
analysis to reveal any possible contagion eﬀects. In this analysis we
let each bank (and region13) fail in turn and then check whether
any of the other banks has an exposure on the failed bank that
results in a loss larger than its tier 1 capital. A practical issue is
that we do not have adequate information about the buﬀer capi-
tal of foreign counterparties or, in the aggregate, of regional ﬁnan-
cial systems. We assume that the foreign regions never fail as a
result of the bankruptcy of other banks (or regions). This is plau-
sible because these categories represent large regions, and it seems
highly unlikely that a complete region will fail due to the failure of a
(number of) Dutch bank(s). However, this assumption might under-
estimate the fragility of the Dutch system, as domestic defaults could
trigger defaults abroad, which could in turn weaken institutions in
the Netherlands. Second-round eﬀects occur when other banks, fol-
lowing the failure of the ﬁrst failed bank, also fail. It is assumed
that if more than one bank fails in any given round, they all fail
simultaneously.
Conclusions based on our scenario analyses have to be drawn
with care. For example, the scenario analysis presented here does
not allow for dynamic eﬀects. The large exposures data reports are
not complete and make use of risk limits, which in practice are drawn
upon to a varying degree. Banks will draw more of their credit line
13This scenario can be described as an entire country running into trouble due
to a domestic crisis, exchange rate crisis, excessive debts, etc.
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in the interbank market if they experience problems; the risk lim-
its thus give the upper bound to contagion risks in the interbank
market. In addition, the use of outstandings might underestimate
risks, since credit lines will be drawn in case of distress. The use of
end-of-year data might underestimate risks as well, because inter-
bank assets and liabilities tend to decrease in December every year.
The lack of data on tier 1 capital for foreign branches forces fur-
ther assumptions. Furthermore, the role of collateral has not been
included in this analysis. The same remarks hold for the survey data
analysis. In addition, the data reported by the ten banks in the sur-
vey data had to be standardized. Since the ten banks use diﬀerent
internal systems and deﬁnitions, their reports diﬀer in their precision
and may show some inconsistencies.
4.2.1 Large Exposures Data
The scenario analysis provides important insights into the conta-
gion risks in the Dutch banking sector. Figure 2 gives an overview
Figure 2. Cumulative Eﬀects of Simulated Failures
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of the cumulative eﬀects of a bank failure (including the failure of a
region) for each loss rate by round. The left panel shows the mean of
the cumulative number of failed banks per round and per loss rate,
while the right panel shows the mean of the cumulative assets of
these failed banks per round and per loss rate. The ﬁrst, initiating
bank is excluded in these measures. Note that “assets aﬀected” is
deﬁned as the total assets of failed banks. This implies that although
a bank may suﬀer losses following a bankruptcy, these losses are not
included in the measure of assets aﬀected if the bank does not fail
consequently. However, such a small loss makes the bank in question
more vulnerable for any other losses it may incur in future rounds.
For both graphs it holds that the cumulative eﬀects increase when
the loss rate is increased. For a 75 percent loss rate, however, there
are more rounds (i.e., ﬁve). The explanation for this result is that
for the higher loss rate (100 percent), all banks that can be aﬀected
are already aﬀected in previous rounds. Hence, no banks are left to
be aﬀected.
The steep rise in the second round in the left panel indicates
that a large number of banks fail in this round. The rise in the right
panel is much less pronounced. From this, the picture emerges that
a small number of sometimes large banks topple in the ﬁrst round,
followed by a larger number of small banks.14 Then defaults taper
oﬀ.
Table 7 conﬁrms these results. It shows the maximum number
of failed banks and aﬀected assets per loss rate. For comparison
purposes, we include the results of estimation without any prior
information (labeled “Maximum Entropy”). The maximum-entropy
estimation shows that only with a loss rate of 100 percent are sizable
losses incurred. Moreover, the maximum-entropy estimation results
underestimate contagion eﬀects, in line with Mistrulli (2005), as both
the number of banks and the percentages of total assets are lower for
each of the loss rates shown. The only exception is the 100 percent
loss rate: it is clear that the maximum-entropy method does not
function for the highly concentrated and internationalized Dutch
market.
14Although it is tempting to think of these rounds as indicating something
about time, this is not appropriate. Rather, it reﬂects how “close” two banks are.
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Figure 3. Eﬀects of the Loss Rate on Total Assets Aﬀected
Note: In this graph, the eﬀects of and on foreign regions have been
excluded.
Strikingly, for the large exposures data, the asset losses increase
sharply for a 75 percent loss rate. In this case, the total assets lost as
a percentage of total assets increases from 2 percent to 90 percent.
However, this only holds if foreign regions are included in the analy-
sis. The large banks do not fail if the foreign regions are excluded,
meaning that the results are driven by the failure of the large banks.
Consequently, we might ﬁnd a turning point at which (one of) the
large banks fail(s). This is shown in ﬁgure 3. In this ﬁgure we graph
the mean and maximum amount of total aﬀected assets relative to
the loss rate. We clearly see a rise in the mean and a sharp increase
in the maximum of total aﬀected assets for a 75 percent loss rate. At
this rate, three large banks fail for the ﬁrst time. The fourth large
bank already failed at a 60 percent loss rate. This is also visible in
the maximum amount of aﬀected total assets in the ﬁgure. From
this ﬁgure, we might conclude that for a loss rate below 75 percent,
no systemic risk emerges.
Vol. 2 No. 2 Interbank Contagion in the Dutch Banking Sector 123
The large banks only aﬀect a relatively small number of banks
(at most, twenty-four), with low asset losses. Although the failure of
a large bank may result in the bankruptcy of at least one bank of all
other types, the failure of a large bank does not aﬀect any of the other
large banks. The large banks themselves only fail if either the region
Europe or North America fails. In contrast to our expectations, for-
eign subsidiaries and branches show no explicit vulnerability to the
failure of other foreign subsidiaries, branches, or foreign regions but
are equally exposed to all types.15 Investment ﬁrms are exposed to
all banks.
The region Europe turns out to be the largest risk for the Dutch
banking sector, resulting in the highest number of fallen banks and
the highest losses in terms of assets. This is intuitive, given the
interbank-lending matrix, which showed that many banks have large
exposures to Europe. The failure of North America or Asia aﬀects
the sector during four rounds, while the eﬀects of a failure of Turkey
and RoW only last three rounds. Asset losses are largest for Europe
(e1,690 billion) when, at most, ﬁfty-six banks fail. All large banks
fail if Europe goes bankrupt with a 75 percent and 100 percent
loss rate. If the region North America fails, thirty-four banks fail,
and asset losses amount to e680 billion. Fewer and smaller banks
fail following the simulated failure of Turkey (twenty-four banks,
e40 billion), Asia (twenty-six banks, e40 billion), or RoW (eighteen
banks, e35 billion).
In ﬁgure 4, the eﬀects of a failure on the domestic number and
assets aﬀected are graphed relative to the size of the bank that
ﬁrst bankrupted, for a loss rate of 100 percent. The largest amount
of assets lost (e44 billion) is larger than the mean total assets
of the other Dutch banks (e10 billion) but many times smaller than
the mean total assets of the large banks (e370 billion). Note that the
assets of the ﬁrst bankrupted bank are not included in this mea-
sure. Except for the foreign regions, the failure of one of the large
banks or a foreign subsidiary has the largest impact on the domes-
tic banking system. There is, however, no substantial evidence that
larger banks have higher contagion eﬀects on the domestic system.
15The parent company may guarantee its foreign subsidiary or branch, for
which counterparties consequently will not experience credit losses. This is not
taken into account here.
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Figure 4. Eﬀects of Size on Number and Total Assets
Aﬀected
Note: In these graphs, the eﬀects of and on foreign regions have been
excluded.
Although the failure of a large bank leads to the highest number of
bank failures if foreign regions are excluded from our analysis, the
failure of a relatively small bank, a foreign subsidiary, leads to the
highest domestic asset losses. Furthermore, the failure of a type 2
bank (“Other Dutch”) also has a large eﬀect on the number of failed
banks and on the amount of assets lost. An explanation for this
result might be that the large banks are especially linked to foreign
regions and, to a much lesser extent, to the other banks in the Dutch
banking system. Because of this, the eﬀects of a failure of a large
bank are mainly absorbed by the foreign regions and can aﬀect the
Dutch banks only to a lesser extent. However, since we have no infor-
mation on foreign banks’ assets or capital, the eﬀects of a domestic
failure on foreign regions are not shown in ﬁgure 4. Given the fact
that the large banks are strongly connected to foreign regions, the
eﬀects of a domestic failure on foreign regions could be substantial,
which, in turn, may have repercussions on the Dutch sector.
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Although the results from the ﬁrst scenario analysis generally
conﬁrm expectations, they do show some surprises. The large banks
aﬀect a considerable, but still limited, number of banks. Shocks
resulting from the failure of a large bank are for a large (but not com-
plete) part absorbed by the foreign regions. This is logical in light of
the large foreign exposures held by the large banks, as shown by the
interbank-lending matrix. Surprisingly, the bankruptcy of one of the
foreign banks in the Dutch banking system results in a high(er) level
of lost assets. On the other hand, all these risks are run at a loss
rate of 100 percent, whereas losses are many times smaller for lower
loss rates. The 100 percent loss rate seems rather high.16 Europe as
a whole does represent a systemic risk, however.
4.2.2 Survey Data
In this section we discuss the scenario using the interbank-lending
matrix incorporating the survey data. Similarly to the previous
analysis, this scenario analysis shows that a higher loss rate results
in higher cumulative losses in terms of the number of fallen banks
and assets lost (ﬁgure 5). On average, though, the eﬀects are larger
for all loss rates. In this analysis we ﬁnd that a simulated failure
with a 75 percent loss rate again has longer-lasting eﬀects than for
the 100 percent loss rate. First-round eﬀects are, only with respect
to the assets lost, largest for all loss rates. This does not hold for
the number of failed banks, however, where the number of failed
banks increases in the second round. From this we come to the
same conclusion as before: a limited number of sometimes large(r)
banks fail in the ﬁrst round, while many smaller banks follow in later
rounds.
Table 8 shows, again, that losses increase sharply for a loss rate
of 75 percent. However, these losses are lower than in the previous
analysis. The percentage of assets lost now amounts to 45 percent
for a 75 percent loss rate and to “only” 73 percent for a complete
loss. Again, this can be explained by the interbank-lending matrix
used for this analysis and shown in table 6. It showed that only the
large banks increased their exposure on foreign regions, while all
other banks decreased their interbank positions to foreign regions.
16See footnote 4.
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Figure 5. Cumulative Eﬀects of Simulated Failures
Note: In these graphs, the eﬀects of and on foreign regions have been
excluded.
Therefore, the total amount of assets that can possibly be aﬀected if
one of these regions fails is lower. If the foreign regions are excluded,
losses are limited but higher than before. In this scenario analysis,
a turning point exists at which the large banks fail as well.
If Europe, North America, and RoW are excluded, a failure of
one of the large banks aﬀects the highest number of banks and results
in the highest asset losses. Strikingly, only a few other Dutch banks
(type “Other Dutch”) fail following the bankruptcy of one of the
large banks (at most, ﬁve per large bank). The large banks them-
selves only fail following the failure of Europe or North America
at a 75 percent or 100 percent loss rate or following the failure of
RoW at a 100 percent loss rate. The risks that many subsidiaries
with Turkish parents run on their home country is reﬂected by the
fact that only Turkish subsidiaries fail if the region Turkey goes
bankrupt.
Again, Europe and North America inﬂuence the results the most.
The inﬂuence of the large banks seems to be somewhat larger,
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though, than in the previous analysis. The eﬀects of a failure of the
other types—i.e., other Dutch banks, foreign subsidiaries, branches,
and investment ﬁrms—have also increased. Foreign subsidiaries have
larger eﬀects on the assets aﬀected than do other Dutch banks.
If the eﬀects of the diﬀerent foreign regions are analyzed, it
becomes clear that Europe, North America, and RoW are the main
risks for the Dutch banking sector. If Europe fails, the highest num-
ber of banks fails (forty-ﬁve) and the largest amount of assets is lost
(e1,290 billion). A simulated failure of the North American region
results in thirty failed banks, with asset losses of e480 billion. If Asia
fails, a maximum of twenty-eight banks fail, with asset losses of e41
billion. In total, thirty banks fail if RoW goes bankrupt, with asset
losses of e516 billion. A failure of Turkey does not lead to large con-
tagion risks: a maximum of six banks fail, and only ﬁrst-round eﬀects
result. Furthermore, all of the failed banks in this case are foreign
subsidiaries with the parent company in this particular region.
The asset size of the ﬁrst failed bank still seems unrelated to
the number of failed banks and the total assets lost in the domestic
banking system in the scenario analysis. Although ﬁgure 6 shows an
upward-sloping line, this result is triggered by a single data point.
Total asset losses (e125 billion) in this scenario analysis are many
times larger, though, than in the previous analysis and are a signif-
icant part of the mean total assets of the large banks. The eﬀects of
a failure on foreign banks are, again, not included in ﬁgure 6.
Similarly to the previous analysis, the main threat for the Dutch
banking sector stems from abroad. The foreign regions, especially
Europe, represent the riskiest counterparties in the case of failure.
The large banks only aﬀect a limited number of banks, though,
resulting in higher asset losses this time. Again, there are some sur-
prises in the form of smaller banks that aﬀect a large number of
banks with high asset losses.
4.3 Large Exposures Data versus Survey Data
In the discussion of the outcomes using either the large exposures
data or survey data, it was already apparent that the results are
qualitatively similar: large, systemically important banks have a siz-
able impact but do not infect the entire system. Looking at the
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Figure 6. Eﬀects of Size on Number and Total Assets
Aﬀected
Note: In these graphs, the eﬀects of and on foreign regions have been
excluded.
regions, we see that especially the region Europe is important as a
possible source of contagion.
In addition to this qualitative assessment, we inspected the
underlying estimated exposure matrices. For each individual bank
the range, mean, and median are all very similar. We also looked
at the distribution of percentage diﬀerences between the large expo-
sures data and the survey data, but interpretation is diﬃcult because
(i) it is not clear which of the matrices is the true matrix, and (ii) the
tails of the distributions are mainly driven by percentage changes in
bank exposure pairs that are very small.
Summarizing, we ﬁnd that the commonly used large exposures
data seem to provide a similar picture of the interbank market char-
acteristics and of contagion eﬀects compared to the survey data we
obtained. This can be interpreted as a validation of the approach
used in previous studies.
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5. Conclusions
The most important risks in the Dutch interbank market stem from
exposures on foreign counterparties—in particular, European and
North American counterparties. This result holds regardless of the
information source used. The national interbank market only seems
to carry systemic risks if a large bank fails, although even in this
extreme and unlikely event, not all of the remaining banks are
aﬀected. In fact, none of the large bank failures trigger the failure of
another large bank. The Dutch banking system hence cannot be pic-
tured as one single line of dominoes, and the amounts outstanding
per counterparty are small (losses are limited). The linkages between
the large banks and the foreign regions seem to prevent large(r)
negative eﬀects from spreading further into the Dutch market.
This conclusion points to the largest risk for Dutch banks: the
foreign regions. Many banks have exposures on the foreign regions.
Therefore, if problems arise in one of these regions, then all types of
banks will be severely hit. In particular, foreign subsidiaries and/or
branches are vulnerable to shocks originating in the parent-company
region. However, the indirect eﬀects the failure of a foreign bank may
have on the Dutch banking sector are not included in this analysis.
Furthermore, it has to be borne in mind, on the one hand, that
the foreign regions are aggregated accounts. Each foreign region is
formed by summing all exposures to counterparties in that particular
region. It is hard to imagine that a region (i.e., all the counterpar-
ties within it) could go bankrupt as a whole. On the other hand,
examples such as the Asia crisis or the recession following Septem-
ber 11, 2001, point out that we cannot exclude such a scenario.
Overall, interbank exposures across countries may form an impor-
tant link between banks, resulting in considerable possible systemic
risks. This will also hold for other small open economies.
Our analysis also shows that maximum entropy is not appro-
priate for estimating bilateral exposures in a concentrated market,
such as the Dutch, the Belgian, or the Swiss market. In addition, for
an accurate assessment of the risks in the interbank market, there
is not a clear advantage in using either the large exposures data
report or survey data. Both data sources give an adequate and sim-
ilar overview of the risks in the interbank market. At the individual
bank level, however, there are important diﬀerences. Working from
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the premise that the survey data are a more reliable source of infor-
mation, since they have been specially requested, this implies that
the large exposures data reports are not well suited for monitoring
the interbank exposures of a particular bank. However, for estimates
of contagion eﬀects at the macro level, the large exposures data form
an appropriate (and easier) data source.
The most important conclusion, based on the research presented,
is that in order to improve the informativeness of the analyses, infor-
mation about foreign exposures is necessary. Other studies in this
area suﬀer from the same issue. In an increasingly integrated market
like the interbank market, it might therefore be fruitful to merge the
various analyses.
Appendix. Cross-Entropy Minimization
The minimization problem can be formally written as
min
N∑
i=l
N∑
j=l
xij ln
(
xij
x0ij
)
(3)
subject to
N∑
j=l
xij = ai (4)
N∑
i=l
xij = lj (5)
xij ≥ 0, (6)
with the conventions that xij =0 if and only if x0ij =0 and ln(0/0) =
0. The RAS algorithm solves this type of problem (Wells 2004).17
Using the large exposures data, this becomes
x0,Iij =
⎧⎨
⎩
0 if i = j
Eij∑N
J=l Eij
ai
if bank i reports an exposure to bank
j in the large exposures data,
(7)
17See Blien and Graef (1997) for an extended explanation of the RAS algorithm
or refer to Censor and Zenios (1997) for more information.
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where Eij represents the exposure of bank i to bank j as reported
in the large exposures data.
Using the survey data together with the large exposures data in
the second part of the research, this becomes
x0,IIij =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if i = j
Rij∑N
J=l Rij
ai
if bank i reports an exposure to bank
j in the survey data
Eij∑N
J=l Eij
ai otherwise,
(8)
where Rij reﬂects the exposure of bank i to bank j as reported in
the survey data.
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